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Abstract 
 
 
Movement and, more particularly, kinesthesia as a modality and as a metaphor has become of interest at the 
intersection of phenomenology and cognitive science. In this paper I wish to combine three historically related 
strands, aisthêsis, kinesthesis and aesthetics, to advance an argument concerning the aesthetic value of certain 
somatic sensations. Firstly, by capitalizing on a recent regard for somatic or inner bodily senses, including 
kinesthesia, proprioception and the vestibular system by drawing lines of historical continuity from earlier 
philosophical investigations on bodily background experience, initially from aisthêsis, Aristotle’s concept of 
the sensory faculty. Secondly, concepts of the sensate body are advanced through discoveries in the nervous 
system and related discussions of the ‘inner’ senses such as Charles Bell’s ‘muscle sense’ (1826), and what 
Charles Sherrington later termed ‘proprio-ception’ (1906). Thirdly, we consider the possibility of aesthetic 
status for those inner senses, where recently aesthetic arguments by Montero (2006) and Cole and Montero 
(2007) seek to determine aesthetic criteria for proprioception, and similarly in dance theory the aesthetic status 
of kinesthesia has been questioned (e.g. Foster 2011). Finally we consider whether previous exposure to a 
‘grammar’ of movement is a factor in determining the relative aesthetic value. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Increased attention has been given to movement and, more significantly, the subjectively-
felt qualitative dynamic of movement, kinesthesia, within phenomenologically-influenced 
studies in cognitive science and embodied cognition. Recently work on the philosophy of 
embodied gesture and movement in the performing arts has begun to shift the focus away 
from movement per se, and to consider the effects of gesture and movement in terms of 
performance (e.g. Shusterman 2009; 2011) and the relationship between gesture and agency 
(e.g. Noland 2009). Considering the aesthetics of movement most commonly entails a need 
for interpretation by a somewhat static audience. In this case there remain few treatments of 
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the felt qualities of movement, utilizing the so-called ‘muscle sense,’ the ‘interoceptive’ or 
somatic senses that include kinaesthesia, proprioception and the vestibular or balance 
system. Research on dance in particular, or the performing arts in general, deals only 
sporadically with the particularity of these somatic sensations, compounded by non-
standardized or confused terminology dealing with those modalities that pertain to 
movement. The first part of this paper clarifies the terminology by returning to a historically 
significant treatment of bodily sensations, aisthêsis, a generalized sense faculty within 
Aristotle. From this generalized aisthêsis are derived ‘coanesthesia’ in the eighteenth 
century, the more particular ‘muscle sense’ (Muskelsinn) in the nineteenth century, and 
‘proprio-ception’ and ‘kinesthesia’ in the early twentieth. Throughout this unfolding story 
the emphasis is placed on how aisthêsis binds sensation into aesthetic evaluations. In 
proceeding from aisthêsis, via kinesthesis, to aesthetics in following sections, I consider 
how we might sequester the aesthetic value of movement, and by extension, isolate and 
examine the particularity of movement for movement’s sake. 
 
Aesthetic accounts usually center upon visual experience, rarely considering “other modes 
of experience and forms of attention” such as tactility, as Johnson (2002:61) observes. Yet 
the etymological and historical derivation of ‘aesthetics’ reveals a different story, able to be 
defined as dealing with physical, material things perceptible by the senses. ‘Aesthetics’ 
derives etymologically from stem aesthe, ‘feel, apprehend by the senses’ (OED, 1989), the 
basis for aisthêsis as the putative sensory faculty for example in Aristotle’s De Anima (c350 
BCE) and De Sensu et Sensibilibus (c350 BCE), although we note some antecedents. 
Accordingly, the first section explores the utility of re-examining aisthêsis within these 
proliferating and specialized neurophysiological terms such as kinaesthesia (from Greek, 
kinein to move, and aesthêsis as sensation), somaesthesia (from Greek somatos, body, and 
aisthêsis, sensation), proprioception (Latin, proprius to own, and percipere, to perceive) and 
coenesthesia (the feeling of inhabiting the body). This paper combines the related strands, 
aisthêsis, kinesthesia and aesthetics, through the following structure. In the first section 
‘From aisthêsis to kinesthesis’ I investigate how movement and, more particularly, 
kinesthesia as a modality and as a metaphor has become of interest at the intersection of 
phenomenology and cognitive science. Situating the relationship between aisthêsis that 
collectively constitutes the bodily or somatic senses, and kinesthesia as the sense of 
movement, I follow David Morris (2010) in demonstrating how this phenomenological 
interest has met with empirical validation through a renewed interest in the dynamics of 
movement within cognitive science (e.g. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone 1999, 2010; Berthoz 
2000). The second section tracks how aisthêsis develops into the more medicalized 
language of a distinct ‘muscle sense’ from Charles Bell, and the emergence of the concepts 
of ‘kinaesthesia’ from Henry Charlton Bastian, and ‘proprio-ception’ from Charles 
Sherrington. The third section concentrates on neurophysiological discoveries of movement 
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and the sensory-motor around this period. The fourth section ‘kinesthesia to aesthetics’ 
threads through these historical treatments of movement into recent arguments made by 
Montero (2006a) and Cole and Montero (2007) about the aesthetic value of proprioception, 
in order to consider whether kinaesthesia is equally deserving of aesthetic value, both for 
the embodied subject and for outward observers.  However, my argument will be achieved 
through different means. 
 
 
1. From Aisthêsis to Kinesthesis 
 
After admitting that a work of art is produced for apprehension by the senses, and that 
fundamentally the purpose of such art is to “arouse feelings” in us, in his 1835 lectures on 
aesthetics Hegel rather dismissively pronounced: “art is related only to the two theoretical 
senses of sight and hearing, while smell, taste and touch remain excluded from the 
enjoyment of art” (1998:36). Conversely, Herder had discoursed on the virtues of touch in 
relation to vision in his 1776 appreciation of sculpture Das Plastik. Touch amongst the 
senses, as also sculpture amongst the fine arts, traditionally enjoyed a lowly position in their 
respective hierarchies. Reading against the consensus voiced later by Hegel on sensory 
hierarchies, Herder wished to reclaim the significance of touch. If sight [Gesicht] reveals 
shapes, he argued, touch [Gefühl] revealed bodies, so cementing touch as necessary in 
revealing the form of things rather than mere appearance (1776/2002:35). In a rather artful 
analogy to illustrate this distinction, Herder considers that if the student of art were to 
encounter something doubtful or contradictory in their interpretation of a piece then they 
should make use of “the fingers of [their] inner sense [den Finger seines inner Sinnes] in 
order to discover that which [they] could not otherwise identify: the shape of the spirit 
within the form [Gestalt des Geistes in deiser Form]” (1776/2002:90). Of course, Herder’s 
project of a sustained reexamination of tactility within aesthetics is not trivial. But his 
invitation to discern the immaterial spirit [Geist] of a material work by using the 
metaphorical ‘fingers’ of a putative ‘inner sense’ invokes a striking tactile metaphor, a 
virtual probing, an imaginative grasping or palpating of an aesthetic work the better to 
discern its ‘true’ or intended form. In this, Herder clearly shares with Hegel an imperative to 
discover the overriding definitive meaning or spirit of an artwork.  
 
Moreover, while the larger project of the revaluation of tactility within aesthetic encounters 
is ongoing, not only in sculptural terms but also in practices of looking at pictures (see e.g. 
Merleau-Ponty 1969, Lopes 2002), film (e.g. Barker 2009), or dance (Foster 2011, Noland 
2008), I focus upon the long history of the more abstracted tactility indicated by Herder’s 
‘inner sense.’ This is premised not on the facticity of ownership of an individual body 
wherein distinct sensations of sight, touch, taste and so on supposedly arise, but instead on 
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the particularities of potentially indistinct yet commonly recognizable bodily or somatic 
sensing as such, akin to Herder’s inner Sinnes. An inwardly-directed form of touching 
thereby reveals the body’s reflexive awareness of its own capacities of sensing and feeling, 
understood within subsequent contexts in terms of ‘interoception,’ ‘somesthesia,’ 
‘coanasthesia,’ and so on. This inner sense is subdivided into ‘proprioception’ and 
‘kinaesthesia’ in the twentieth century. But something akin to Herder’s inner senses have 
been a genuine neuroanatomical area of inquiry in some form since Plato’s Theaetetus and 
Aristotle’s De Anima. Let us now examine how the common root aisthêsis relates to inner 
touch. 
 
Herder’s conceptualization of the inner senses as a kind of metaphorical or imaginative 
touching involves a somatic reflexivity, a knowing ‘grip’ on the body and its movement that 
forms a long-running strand in philosophy and medicine, the place of “a kind of inner touch, 
by which we are able to grasp ourselves,” as Heller-Roazen (2007:241) summarizes. To 
reconsider the historical and etymological aisthêsis is to elaborate also upon ‘common 
sense’ (aesthesis koine) and later the medicalized term coenesthesia, so within the concept 
of aisthêsis and its derivatives we find a productive wellspring for reconsidering the type 
and nature of experiences that arise from perception through the body. This long trajectory 
starts from a broad concept originating through classical scholarship, something the Abbé 
de Lignac will term “the sense of the coexistence of the body” in his Elements of 
Metaphysics Drawn from Inner Experience of 1752, and a series of sensations which Turgot 
in his Encylopédie entry of 1755-6, acknowledging Lignac, wished to place under a special 
class, “inner touch” (in Heller-Roazen 2007:242). Variously understood by their 
contemporaries in terms of an expanded notion of touch as bodily self-perception, this 
includes Lamarck’s “feeling sense” which includes touch both inside and outside the 
individual, “self feeling,” “the tonality of the sensory nerves” (Henle), or “the consciousness 
of our sensory condition” (Weber), amongst other formulations, all revealing the 
preponderance of conceiving the experience of manifold inner senses specifically in terms 
of some kind of touch. Recently, the philosopher Richard Shusterman has written 
extensively on what he terms ‘somaesthetics’ or “body consciousness” in the performing 
arts. He explains this as “the embodied consciousness that a living sentient body directs at 
the world” (2009:133). 
 
This section therefore charts those aspects of aisthêsis pertinent to considering the 
significance and distinguishability of movement and bodily position in space. We return to 
Plato and Aristotle to establish the necessity for touch, and a generalized inner touch 
faculty. In classical Greek scholarship the word aisthêsis [αἴσθησις] is translated by most, 
including the standard Greek-English Lexicon by Liddell and Scott (1843) and Chappell 
(2004), simply as ‘sensation’ or ‘sense-perception.’ At another point, Liddell and Scott 
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elaborate upon it as “perception by the senses, especially by feeling, but also by seeing, 
hearing, etc. […] also of the mind, perception, knowledge of a thing” (in Chappell p. 53). 
However, Michael Frede (1987) rightfully takes issue with the vagueness of this translation, 
arguing there are three senses of aisthêsis that need to be distinguished. Firstly, an ordinary 
or more general sense like ‘awareness’ not necessarily connected with sensory perception. 
In both Aristotle’s Politics (1267a29) and Plato’s Symposium (220c7), for example, 
aisthanomai is translated as ‘I notice.’ Secondly, a narrower sense as used in Phaedo and 
Republic in which aisthêsis necessarily involves the body, does not equate to knowledge as 
such and is therefore allied with doxa (belief), and consequently not strictly sense 
perception. Thirdly, the narrower sense as used in Theaetetus (184-187) in which aisthêsis 
comes to mean an entirely “passive affection of the mind” and so, more ordinarily, “sense-
perception.” If there is an affection and therefore an alteration, what would be the cause? In 
Theaetetus (157-160) it is not simply the perception of objects in the outside world, but also 
dreams and illusions. This suggests that “the primary objects of aisthêsis are internal to the 
mind” (Chappell 2004:54, his emphasis), to be categorized as immediate experiences, 
impressions – in modern parlance, ‘sense-data.’ But in another passage (151-187) Plato 
considers and subsequently rejects the straightforward proposal that knowledge is 
perception; at times in this passage ‘perception’ means something like ‘immediate sensory 
awareness,’ and at others it means judgments about that awareness. This raises the question 
as to how such judgments or beliefs may emerge from immediate sensory awareness, and 
this forms the basis for the discussion in Theaetetus 187-201, summarized thus: 
“Knowledge is not to be found in our bodily experiences, but in our reasonings about those 
experiences” (186d2). If immediate sensory awareness is in flux, its epistemological value 
is limited. “Strictly speaking, sensation in itself has no cognitive content” summarizes 
Chappell (p.152). This is unsurprising if the word aisthêsis goes against the modern 
distinction of ‘sensation’ and ‘perception.’ 
 
However, touch has a rarefied status elsewhere for Aristotle, and for further clarification of 
‘inner’ touch it is instructive to see why. Capable of fine discrimination in the aesthetic 
evaluation of objects like a piece of sculpture, nonetheless touch remains at the bottom of 
the sensory hierarchy as we share it with beasts (e.g. Ethics 1176a1-2). Because there is no 
obvious single organ to which it corresponds, unlike sight (the eye) or hearing (the ear), 
touch is distinct since flesh is the medium, rather than the organ, of touch. Aristotle 
correctly moves away from the locus of skin in order to argue “the sense-faculty of touch is 
within,” like internal organs, rather than “without” (De Anima 423b), like skin, eyeballs or 
ears. Wearing a glove, we may still stroke an animal or imprecisely sense an object’s 
texture; similarly, when walking with a stick we apprehend the roughness of the ground. 
The fleshy medium is corporeal then, and extendable through prosthetic means: “so it is 
necessary that the body be the ongrown medium of the touch-faculty and that the sensations 
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(which are indeed many) take place through it,” says Aristotle (423a, original emphasis). At 
times straightforwardly cutaneous, at other times Aristotelian touch is more diffuse or a 
generalized contact. From aisthêsis and a more diffuse model of touch in Aristotle, we now 
focus on one particular strand within somatic perception. 
 
Given the role of the body in producing a sense faculty (aisthêsis) oriented to experiences of 
sensuousness as such, and contrary to his own influential formulation of a five sense 
sensorium in De Anima and De Sensu et Sensibilibus, touch for Aristotle is more bodily and 
categorically diffuse. What of the somatosensory system that helps constitute a sensate 
background, necessary for the feeling of having (proprioception) and moving (kinaesthesia) 
a body, which depends in turn upon interaction between subsystems including the vestibular 
or balance sense? Next we consider how this generalized inner touch becomes a distinct 
muscle sense. 
 
 
2. The History of a Distinct Muscle Sense 
 
Between Aristotle and nineteenth century physiologists like Bastian and Bell, Condillac and 
his followers describe a so-called ‘active touch’ (Jones 1972:299) which predates Gibson’s 
twentieth century use of the phrase (e.g. Gibson 1962). But attention to the particularity of 
what is sensed through the muscular body becomes of scientific interest in Germany as the 
Muskelsinn, literally muscle sense. This terminology was apparently first introduced into 
Britain as early as 1820 by Thomas Brown in his Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human 
Mind, where these sensations were characterized as “an awareness of muscular contraction” 
(Jones 1972:299). The new body of research was then reported to the British scientific 
community by Sir William Hamilton writing in 1846, and subsequently William Hammond 
in 1871 reports in The Journal of Psychological Medicine a paper in a German journal of 
science and medicine of the previous year by a Professor George, a section entitled ‘The 
Muscular Sense (Muskelsinn)’ (Hamilton 1871: 396-398). Parallel to George’s German 
articulation of Muskelsinn as something distinct from cutaneous touch (Tastsinn), 
generalized bodily feeling (Gefühlssinn) as Kirchner had termed it, or common sense 
(Gemeinempfindungen) for Wundt as Titchener reminds us (1908:158), in Brown’s lectures 
XX-XXII on touch the sensations particular to a muscle sense are recognizably distinct and 
worthy of attention: 
 
The feeling of resistance is … to be ascribed not to our organ of touch, but to our 
muscular frame, […] as forming a distinct organ of sense … The sensations of this 
class, are … commonly, so obscure, as to be scarcely heeded … but there is no 
contraction, even of a single muscle, which is not attended with some faint degree of 
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sensation, that distinguishes it from the contraction of other muscles or from other 
degrees of contraction of the same muscle. (Brown 1820, I, 496, original emphasis) 
 
This focus on the distinctness is retained so that shortly afterwards he states: “each motion 
of the … limb, whether produced by one or more of the … muscles, is accompanied with a 
certain feeling … which we distinguish from every other feeling accompanying every other 
quantity of contraction” (Brown 1820 I:497, original emphasis). In other words, a more 
general awareness of bodily position is maintained through more localized and distinct 
muscular tensions and contractions. In line with his forebears, this is interpreted as a form of 
bodily touch which extends beyond the cutaneous and proposes the whole body as an organ 
of sense, where “our muscular frame is not merely a part of the living machinery of motion, 
but is also truly an organ of sense” (Brown 1820 I:501). In this way, Brown, George, 
Wundt and their contemporaries could be considered as re-articulating the ongoing inner 
touch of aisthêsis, while focusing on its manifestations through muscle fibers and the 
muscular frame. 
 
Murray’s 1909 essay ‘Organic Sensation’ provides an historical overview of what she 
collectively describes as the “sensory contributions from the internal tissues” (1909:400). 
Reviewing neurophysiological work from the nineteenth century onwards, she remarks 
upon “the least developed and systematized sphere of our consciousness” in order to “throw 
new light on processes of localization and attention” (1909:402). Digestive, muscle, and 
respiratory systems for example each produce their own sensations, what Ebbinghaus in 
1902 terms eigenartige Empfindungen (‘strange sensations’). Again, Meumann in a 1907 
article ‘On the sensibility of the internal organs’ celebrates a multiplicity of ‘organic 
sensations’ (innere Tastempfindingen) derived from distributed organs and tissues, but 
actually a direct translation of Meumann’s phrase would offer the now familiar ‘inner touch 
sensations.’ The unusual combination of qualitative diversity yet indistinctness of these 
sensations together obscures “the indefiniteness of localization of the sensations, and their 
deficiency in correlated visual images by which qualitative isolation might be facilitated,” 
Murray argues (1909:400-1). In other words, these sensations remain frustratingly vague 
and therefore unsystematic, and cannot be compared to the clarity that vision enjoys. At the 
end of one section Murray summarizes: 
 
The fusability, absence of memory images, unanalyzability, lack of cohesiveness 
with other sensations, unlocalizability, capacity for eluding the attention, and other 
features ascribed guardedly or confidently in various quarters to our organic 
experience, demand critical verification. (1909:402) 
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The terminological difficulties noted above extend to the laboratory, of course, as that 
legacy of Wundt’s ‘common sensation’ (Gemeinempfingdung) amongst experimental 
psychologists interested in internal or, as Murray puts it, ‘organic’ sensations, is 
problematic. Murray’s frustration is expressed at one point in a footnote referencing this 
vagueness: “The problem is somewhat obscured by the custom deriving from Weber, 
Wundt, and Goldscheider of lumping organic or visceral sensation with the 
Gemeinempfindungen (‘common sensation’), a class which by definition consists in 
whatever residue of sense material proves resistant to elaboration, analysis, and 
localization” (1909:390, footnote 1). The ‘common’ element across these sensations seems 
to be the “pain-pressure-temperature equipment common in his belief to the exterior and 
interior of the body alike” (ibid.). 
 
Against this diffuseness of inner touch, a more refined answer that distinguishes a ‘muscular 
sense’ occurs in Charles Bell’s The Hand (1833), where he considers the interaction 
between touch and movement. His earlier lectures on anatomy proffered a distinct muscle 
sense, in his words a “consciousness of muscular exertion,” akin to a sixth sense 
(1833:195). Bell’s earlier anatomical discoveries reported to the Royal Society of distinct 
specialized sensory and motor nerves had led him to investigate the mechanisms of the 
nervous system that governed and regulated muscular activity. Given that we customarily 
have a sense of muscular coordination, an awareness that heightens with exertions and 
spasms or even the estimation of weights through the use of our hands, Bell states his goal 
thus: “I shall first enquire, if it be necessary to the governance of the muscular frame, that 
there be a consciousness of the state or degree of action of the muscles?” This can be asked 
since “[w]e are sensible of the most minute changes of muscular exertion, by which we 
know the position of the body and limbs, when there is no other means of knowledge open 
to us” (1826:167, original emphasis). In passing he offers the example of a rope-dancer or a 
blind man balancing his body, and finds its explanation in neuroanatomical terms. Referring 
to prior discussion of the interactions of sensory and motor nerves, in deceptively simple 
terms he summarizes: “Between the brain and the muscles there is a circle of nerves; one 
nerve conveys the influence from the brain to the muscle, another gives the sense of the 
condition of the muscle to the brain” (1826:170). Likewise, this bidirectional nervous 
mechanism is referred to in his later book: “there is a nerve of sensibility to convey a 
sensation of the condition of the muscles to the sensorium, as well as a nerve of motion for 
conveying the mandate of the will to the muscles” (1833:196). 
 
This sixth, muscular sense is later termed ‘proprio-ception’ by Sherrington (1906), based on 
his laboratory research conducted on muscular reflexes between 1892-4. Sherrington 
integrated these experimental observations into a prestigious lecture series at Yale and the 
influential monograph The Integrative Action of the Nervous System (1906). In his 
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centenary appreciation of Sherrington’s book and an overview of the lectures, Burke notes 
how Sherrington identified “afferent feedback,” nerve impulses returning to the brain from 
diffuse muscle tissue, and in Lecture III Sherrington considered how these afferents were 
‘proprioceptive’ because they are caused by the organism’s own movements, in contrast 
with ‘exteroceptive’ afferents that convey more distal information from the environment. In 
Lecture IX, Sherrington steps back from the details in order to offer a more panoramic view 
of the evolutionary development of nervous systems through the phylogenetic sequence, 
and notes that “by its branching the motor neurone [sic] obtains hold of many muscle-
fibres” (1906:309), and this diffusion of nerve endings through muscle fibers feeds back to a 
ganglion within the cerebellum, what Lidell and Sherrington will later term the ‘motor unit’ 
(in Burke 2007:892). In other words, the sensory is invariably coupled with the motor, so 
‘sensory-motor.’ This allows Dewey in his famous essay ‘The Reflex Arc Concept in 
Psychology’ of 1896 to speak of “sensory-motor coordination” in a proto-phenomenological 
way which unites an initial sensory act or stimulus, say visually noticing an object or 
person, with an associated movement to achieve an overall action, for example steering a 
car around a raccoon or waving to a friend: 
 
we begin not with a sensory stimulus but with a sensori-motor coordination … [I]n a 
certain sense it is the movement which is primary, and the sensation which is 
secondary, the movement of body, head and eye muscles determining the quality of 
what is experienced. (358; see also Pfeiffer et al. 2007) 
 
Dewey continues in terms that reinforce the unity of perception and action: “The sensory 
quale gives the value of the act, just as the movement furnishes its mechanism and control, 
but both sensation and movement lie inside, not outside the act” (359). Our attention having 
been focused on the muscle senses, Dewey here raises a potential difficulty for aesthetically 
evaluating such movements in the arc of perception and action, given the unity of the 
sensory-motor circuit. Given this indistinct and potentially confused muscular feedback, and 
inner touch remaining diffuse, what factors affect how muscular sensations puncture a 
threshold of conscious awareness within our sensory-motor body, thereby producing 
sensory qualia which might then inform actions or gestures that can be judged by oneself or 
others in aesthetic terms? In dance for example such feedback might be required to better 
effectuate and coordinate particular bodily movements, evaluated by the dancer and their 
audience. What is the nature of the sensory qualia that arise usefully in addition to the 
circuit of the sensory-motor? The answer might involve pain, fatigue and pleasure as 
proprioceptive markers within a series of coordinated actions. 
 
Expressed in more contemporary neurophysiological terms from original research by Mense 
and Stahnke in 1983, the afferent pathway for the sensory-motor body involves “small 
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afferents arising in the muscle and joints,” consisting of “small unmyelinated nerve fibres 
which arise within muscle. Most may be involved in signaling pain, contraction and 
temperature, but some appear to relay information related to fatigue,” explain Cole and 
Montero (2007:302). Like us, Mehnse and Stahnke pondered whether these afferents reach 
consciousness, and what perception they might produce since the system could signal not 
just fatigue or pain but also pleasure. Such low threshold touch, as research by Olaussen et 
al. (2002), involves unmylenated CT fibres which, unlike conventional touch through large 
myelinated fibres, is not localized or clearly perceived, yet occurs in the same brain area 
(insula cortex) as the monitoring functions of internal bodily functions like hunger, pain and 
discomfort. In other words, this low threshold touch is continually present as part of the 
sensations of embodiment (Sherrington’s ‘proprioception’), but also capable of producing 
pleasure from gentle caressing or stroking in a way that registers differently from a higher-
threshold cutaneous touch per se. It supports the mixed sensations Bell (1833) describes in 
another section of The Hand entitled ‘The pleasures arising from the muscular sense:’ 
 
The exercise of the muscular frame is the source of some of our chief enjoyments. 
The beautiful condition of both body and mind shall result from muscular exertion 
and the alternations of activity and bodily repose … This activity is followed by 
weariness and a desire for rest, and although unattended by any describable pleasure 
or local sensation, there is diffused throughout every part of the frame after fatigue a 
feeling almost voluptuous. (Bell 1833:205-6) 
 
Cole aptly refers to this passage to remark on “the rise of kinaesthetic-related pleasure” such 
as jogging or dancing (1995:144), and a notable characteristic of such pleasure is that it 
deepens with practice. The “simple ineffable pleasure of, and of being in, action” as Cole 
and Montero (2007:303), exemplified through dance, is enriched by moving in a way that 
‘feels right,’ that is judged or feels beautiful, so Cole and Montero consequently argue that 
dancers enjoy a more “cognitively enriched” pleasure as a result (303). 
 
On the one hand, the utility of providing musculo-skeletal positional feedback from the 
muscles to the sensorium forms part of a somatosensory background that Husserl and others 
had already assumed (see Husserl’s Ideas II for an explanation of the ‘kinestheses,’ for 
example). This feedback, perceived as proprioception, might be seen as a more 
neurologically specialized explanation for those functions of aisthêsis discussed above, but 
which includes a reflexive ‘grip’ on our body and its motor capacities. This musculo-
skeletal form of perception becomes foregrounded in nonvisual experiences for instance, 
where a congenitally blind subject is aware of their bodily position in space due to 
proprioceptive feedback or ‘muscle sense.’ Without touching anything, a blind person may 
continually sustain and adjust their upright posture. As Bell explains: “It is obvious that he 
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has a sense by which he knows the inclination of his body, and that he has a ready aptitude 
to adjust it, and to correct any deviation from the perpendicular,” and given their lack of 
vision the only source of knowledge is literally through the body, “a sense of the degree of 
exertion in his [sic] muscular frame” (1833:198). So far, Bell’s discussion of a hypothetical 
blind man perceiving their own musculo-skeletal position in space is an adequate definition 
of what Sherrington in 1906 later terms the ‘proprioceptive’ sense. Just like with dancing, 
this attunement to the muscular frame becomes more precise, more deft and flowing, with 
practice. 
 
In proprioceiving a difference between a static body state at one point in time and 
anticipating the possibility of future movement in that body, Bell touches upon a kinesthetic 
element in describing this muscle sense: “We could not command our muscles in standing, 
far less in walking, leaping or running, had we not a perception of the condition of the 
muscles previous to the exercise of the will” (1833:200). The activity of touching, 
especially through the prehensile organ of the hand, also betrays a kinesthetic element, since 
it is the “combined perception” (1833:205) of touch with movement of the hands, arms, and 
fingers that are necessary to embrace objects in the active register necessary for an engaged 
sense of touch. Here Bell anticipates, or perhaps acknowledges, Weber’s 1834 
psychophysical experiments on so-called “active touch” (1978): 
 
So it is affirmed by physiologists … that the sense of touch differs from the other 
senses by this circumstance – that an effort is propagated towards it, as well as a 
sensation received from it. This confusion obviously arises from considering the 
muscular agency, which is directed by the will during the exercise of touch, as 
belonging to the nerve of touch properly. We proceed to show how the sense of 
motion and that of touch are necessarily combined. (1833:197) 
 
This observation, tying in a somatic, active tactility to the principle of movement, again 
expands tactility from mere cutaneous contact, and by invoking the idea of ‘muscular 
agency’ it echoes Herder’s formulation of the inner senses as more active, prehensile 
feelers, an enlivened form of tactility. One may consider for example a choreographer 
tentatively sketching movements for a dance piece, or how a painter approaches a blank 
canvas with a series of broad brush strokes in mind, successively accreting further 
movements and gestures with paint and so sympathetically ‘feeling’ the textures inscribed. 
There are accordingly positive affects that accompany the mastery and refinement of 
movement, not only for a dancer or an accomplished musician but also a cook or a runner, 
say (Cole 1995). The pleasure which arises from muscular activity derives in part from a 
gratification that accompanies any refinement or active shaping of activity, “as that which 
mere dexterity, successful pursuit in the field, or the accomplishment of some work of art 
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may give,” Bell explains (1833:206). Part of the pleasure of the generalized muscle sense, 
and more specifically kinesthesia in this instance, Bell explicitly identifies in aesthetic 
terms. Via Bell we return therefore to a relationship between aisthêsis, kinesthesia and the 
aesthetic values of movement for movement’s sake. The aesthetic and even joyful qualities 
of touch and movement are praised in a rather romanticized way by Bell but which 
nevertheless exhibits a familiarity: 
 
We owe other enjoyments to the muscular sense. It would appear that in modern 
times we know comparatively little of the pleasures arising from motion. The 
Greeks, and even the Romans, studied elegance of attitude and of movement. Their 
apparel admitted of it, and their exercises and games must have led to it. Their 
dances were not the result of mere exuberance of spirits and activity; they combined 
harmony in the motion of the body and limbs, with majesty of gait. They consisted 
more of the unfolding of the arms than of the play of the feet - “Their arms sublime 
that floated on the air.” (1833:206) 
 
 
3. Kinesthesia, proprioception and the bodily senses of movement and position 
 
At this juncture I briefly summarize definitions of kinesthesia initially from psychology and 
its relation to proprioception before developing any distinctly aesthetic line of enquiry 
concerning the differentiation of kinaesthesia and proprioception for the purposes of 
aesthetic evaluation. 
 
Firstly, kinesthesia or the sense of movement. From Greek kinein (to move) and aesthesis, 
kinaesthesia is “a sense mediated by end organs located in muscles, tendons, and joints and 
stimulated by bodily movement and tensions,” and relatedly the “sensory experience 
derived from this sense” says Sklar (1994:15). As part of the haptic system, Gibson 
(1968:111ff) writes of kinesthesia as the perception of the body’s movement not as a 
distinct, individuated sense but as cutting across several perceptual systems, a sense that 
utilizes a range of nerve information including that of muscular tension and balance from 
the vestibular system, collectively returning sensations of movement. Identified in Western 
medicine by Charles Bell in 1826 originally as a ‘muscle sense,’ kinesthesia was initially 
confused with proprioception within this generalized muscle sense, according to Boring 
(1942:525ff). In 1880, Henry Charlton Bastian suggested ‘kinaesthesia’ instead of ‘muscle 
sense’ on the basis that some of the afferent feedback was coming from structures other than 
the muscles including tendons, joints, and skin. With her choreographic eye, Susan Leigh 
Foster notes a shift in research focus at the beginning of the twentieth century from 
kinaesthesia to proprioception, “naming a more focused system of spinal-level neural arcs 
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that continually adjust for the body’s changing relationship to gravity” (2011:7). While 
distinct, both kinesthesia and proprioception involve conscious sensations of bodily position 
in space accomplished through sense-returns from receptors distributed throughout the 
body, in physiology termed “re-afferent feedback” (see e.g. Gibson 1968:111), thereby 
integrating sensory information from other systems. 
 
Secondly, proprioception as the sense of bodily position. Identified in a landmark work of 
1906 by Charles Sherrington, ‘proprio-ception’ is a perceptual system based on the sensory 
returns from nerve endings in muscles and tendons, helping to constitute a sense of the 
position of the body and limbs. In this work Sherrington differentiated between 
‘interoception’ (inwardly directed sensing providing information about internal organs) and 
‘exteroception’ (outwardly directed sensing, the Aristotelian five senses), and 
proprioception was a function of interoception. Koffka’s (1935) gestalt psychology led to 
empirically investigating a sense of the ‘vertical,’ for example, and while what he called the 
‘framework’ of space is a perception, as Gibson (1968) details, the “accompanying 
awareness of the axis of the body is a proprioception” (his emphasis). Compared with a 
grounded spatial framework, then, the axis of the body is literally ‘felt’ as upright or tilted, 
and limbs and their movement are distinguished in reference to this fixed framework. Later 
this becomes significant for Merleau-Ponty, especially when he discusses “the spatiality of 
one’s own body and motility” (1992:112ff), as he acknowledges the influence of empirical 
findings from Gestalt psychologists. The medical writer Leder clarifies the phenomenon: 
 
proprioception traces out a completed sense of my surface body, allowing me to 
adjust every limb, every muscle, in appropriate motoric response to tasks. Though 
visually this sense is subliminal, I can close my eyes and proprioceptively hone in on 
the position, the level of tension and relaxation, in any region of the muscular body. 
(1990:42)  
 
Like other forms of interoception, proprioception as a perceptual subsystem relies not 
simply on the returns of particular receptors (in this case proprioceptors) in the muscles and 
skin, but functions as a nexus of sensations from a variety of sensors throughout the body 
that provide a sense of the body’s and limbs’ felt position in space as a series of 
subjectively-felt muscular tensions, and therefore feedback as to bodily posture and 
equilibrium (Gibson 1966:34). In a completely darkened room, for example, one’s body is 
felt as upright, or one’s arms sensed as outstretched, as a result of proprioception. 
 
Thirdly, the vestibular system which helps constitute a sense of balance. Deriving from the 
‘vestibule’ area of the inner ear, the vestibular system connects up information picked up 
from weighted hair cells in the cochlea, triggered by movements of fluid within three 
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semicircular canals oriented roughly along the three spatial axes. These are the horizontal, 
anterior, and posterior canals which pick up turning movements and bodily orientation, and 
lateral movement is picked up through the otoliths, which sense linear accelerations 
(Lackner and DiZio 2005:117). Rather than a distinct ‘sense’ itself, bodily inertia or change 
of bodily orientation or direction is picked up through this system, and feeds directly into 
the other somatic senses. To characterize it simply as balance neglects the complexity of its 
functions, dealing with inertia and momentum and actively correlating with other 
distributed sense-returns. That is, information from the vestibular system of semicircular 
canals, cochlea, and otoliths collectively help constitute a sense of “bodily postural 
equilibrium,” as Gibson (1966:67) puts it, sensitive to changes in orientation and self-
produced movement, and is therefore indissociable from the other somatic senses. 
Furthermore, feedback from the vestibular system directly influences the eye muscles, and 
this is known as the vestibular-ocular reflex (Lackner and DiZio 2005:119ff). Were this not 
the case then sudden head movements, movements of the eyeballs or acts such as running or 
turning would make the visual perception of the world unclear, distorted or chaotic. In other 
words, without this reflex a fixed point in space could not be tracked. Ballet dancers in 
particular must track a fixed point in space when they go ‘en pointe,’ pirouetting on tiptoe 
without falling down. The technique is to visually locate a fixed object such as a clock, and 
continually maintain eye contact with it while spinning (as the ballerina Deborah Bull 
explains in the BBC documentary The Dancer’s Body, 2002). 
 
After a brief survey of those five senses familiar to us from the days of Aristotle, and 
leading directly on from a discussion of touch, Richard Shusterman usefully summarizes the 
relationship between proprioception, kinesthesia, and “other distinctively bodily senses 
related to the somaesthetic nervous system” (2011:154), advancing his larger project of 
‘somaesthetics.’ He elaborates: 
 
Proprioception concerns the inner sensations and resulting cognition of the position, 
posture, weight, orientation, balance, and internal pressures of one’s body and bodily 
members, while kinaesthetic perception more specifically relates to such internally 
perceived feelings and resulting cognitions that relate to postural, orientational, 
pressure, and equilibrium changes through movement. Other specifically 
somaesthetic sensations are feelings of body temperature and feelings of one’s 
internal organs (often associated with pain). (2011:154) 
 
Is proprioception present in the tactual exploration of an object, for example? Within haptic 
exploration, the active nature of touching in the apprehension of the spatial properties of the 
object surely involves a proprioceptive component, which is linked to the somatic body. 
According to Gallagher, “if proprioception has an object, its object would be, by definition, 
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the body” (in Montero 2006b:150), furthering the idea that aisthêsis is a philosophical 
antecedent of proprioception. Allied to this is Shusterman’s development of somaesthesis as 
“somatic style” (2011), denoting the physicality of embodied acts and the bodily gestures of 
inscription (stylus from Latin is associated with acts of writing and inscription) which forms 
the basis for any aesthetic appreciation. These somaesthetic ideas lie outside of the usual 
recognizable Aristotelian model of five senses and, as we have discovered elsewhere, this 
potentially poses a problem in terms of the indistinctness. It becomes difficult to pin down 
what a particularly somatic style is, and accordingly Shusterman asks: “What features or 
uses of the body are especially formative or expressive of somatic style? Which senses and 
modalities of perception are engaged in our appreciation of somatic style?” (2011:147). 
 
Answering this question will be useful for rethinking the relationship between aisthêsis and 
kinaesthesis, some issues raised earlier about the imprecise nature of somatic sensations, 
and the role of pleasure that arises from the accomplishment of style, that is, the 
proprioceptive or kinaesthetic recognition that a movement or gesture is performed 
skillfully and beautifully. In the early stages of learning a new sensorimotor skill, such as 
learning a dance step or riding a bicycle, we are often required to pay critical attention to the 
body parts engaged in a series of actions. Furthermore, Shusterman “would add that we 
should also pay attention to our breathing and the proprioceptive feel of what we are doing” 
(2009:138). Without getting into specificities of oriental performative styles and historical 
traditions, it happens that in Noh theater “the actor is performing with an explicit, reflective 
image of himself, not only his internal image of his somatic bearing (his proprioceptive 
sense of balance, position, muscle tension, expressiveness, grace, and so forth) but also the 
image of how he senses he appears to the audience” (2009:140): 
 
A further way that proprioception or kinesthesis may help us perceive another 
person’s somatic style is through our empathetic appreciation of that person’s 
movement or posture. Part of our appreciation of watching dance and sports seems to 
be based on our empathetically imagining the feel of the movements that the dancers 
and athletes make. As these feelings essentially involve proprioceptive and 
kinesthetic sensations, so our empathetic watching of their movements will include 
those kinds of feelings (though they will not be strictly identical to those experienced 
by the actual performers themselves). (Shusterman 2011:155) 
 
The question that Shusterman touches upon here, of how movements are perceived and 
evaluated by others, lies at the heart of some recent arguments concerning the aesthetics of 
proprioception and kinaesthesia, to which we now turn. 
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4. From Kinesthesia to Aesthetics: Movement and Muscular Sense 
 
My previous sections presented a preponderance of historical material within which 
particular concepts were etymologically and conceptually tracked. Now we are in a position 
to see how the relation between aesthe, aisthêsis, self-perception (proprioception) and the 
self-perception of movement qua movement threads together and advances a particular 
argument about kinaesthesia. Having started the paper with a reference to Herder’s 
idiosyncratic aesthetics of the tactility of sculpture to introduce the importance of an ‘inner 
sense’ in evaluating aesthetic value, in this section we consider the illustrations of 
kinaesthetic aesthetics within the performing arts and, most pertinently, dance. Based on 
previous definitions of kinaesthesia and proprioception, we can address the question of what 
constitutes a ‘style’ of movement and gesture that may be aesthetically evaluated and 
judged, and cross-cultural variance in the aesthetic criteria of certain styles of movements 
and gestures becomes an issue, especially with regard to non-Western theatrical traditions 
such as Noh, or non-scripted styles of movement in modern dance such as contact 
improvisation. Here – I wish to develop a more focused approach to the body’s own 
awareness of its kinaesthetic capacities in order to answer the question whether, irrespective 
of Montero’s argument that proprioception is an aesthetic sense, and therefore that in her 
words “one can make proprioceptive judgments based on proprioceptive experience” 
(2006:231), then the same could be said for kinaesthesia. The reason that I wish to make 
this argument in parallel to Montero’s argument on proprioception (2006; also Cole and 
Montero 2007) is that, while much of our historical tracing of concepts of the inner senses is 
affirmed in her approach, in order to make her case she makes certain philosophical leaps 
based on inferences from accessible or popularized accounts of empirical research in 
neuroscience that are questionable. Therefore, whilst noting the innovative aspects of 
Montero’s argument concerning proprioception, my argument about kinaesthesia here is 
distinct, and folds into the predominantly historical-conceptual approach adopted in this 
paper so far. 
 
The first step is to provide a brief synthesis of Montero’s arguments about proprioception 
before critically examining steps in her argument more detail. Simply put, Montero (2006a) 
argues that proprioception, the body’s awareness of its own position in space, is worthy of 
aesthetic consideration in itself, irrespective of its visibility by others or any aesthetic 
judgment by outward observer or audience. Elsewhere, Montero argues that if there is such 
aesthetic value, it rests in part upon an ability to proprioceive another’s movement (2006b), 
a claim supported by Susan Leigh Foster’s work on how the body experiences itself 
kinesthetically and apprehends other bodies (e.g. 2005). To make these claims Montero 
needs to make questionable inferences from empirical work in neuroscience. Based on our 
elaboration of aisthêsis, and in line with parallel philosophically inclined work in dance and 
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performance (Foster and Davies), we return to the connections between the muscle sense, 
aisthêsis and kinaesthesia. Furthermore, an unresolved problem from Montero’s analysis of 
proprioception is deemed significant in the case of kinesthesia, where previous exposure to 
a ‘grammar’ of movement is a factor in determining relative aesthetic value. 
 
In ‘Proprioception as an aesthetic sense,’ Montero’s starting position is that proprioception 
“enables one to perceive aesthetic qualities of one’s own bodily movements” (2006a:240). 
This as a prima facie argument which she then seeks to justify by briefly referring to some 
historical work in philosophy and neurophysiology, before engaging in more contemporary 
cognitive neuroscience and empirical findings in neurophysiology. Both this paper and also 
her paper ‘Affective Proprioception’ co-written with neurologist Jonathan Cole (Cole and 
Montero 2007) assume that one is able to perceive the aesthetic qualities of one’s own 
movements in the first place, sharing the prima facie claim, and affording proprioception a 
central role. In her standalone paper a clearer line of argument about proprioception and 
aesthetics occurs, and can be summarized thus: 
 
1a. One may proprioceive one’s own movements 
1b. One is able to sense aesthetic qualities of those movements 
 
By virtue of having a body, and given the lack of neurological cases of the loss of 
proprioception (see e.g. Sacks’s ‘The Disembodied Lady,’ 1985; Cole 1995) for celebrated 
exceptions), 1a understandably forms the basis of Montero’s  prima facie case. Whether or 
not proprioceptive information in itself is a reliable source of sensory input, or whether we 
habitually conjoin this with other sensory information, bodily predispositions or 
intentionalities, the recognition of proprioceptive sensation as distinctly belonging to, or 
arising within, our own bodies should be uncontroversial. A logical extension of this prima 
facie case is that one can recognize the aesthetic qualities of one’s own movements through 
these proprioceptive means (1b). However, Montero fails to mention any intentions 
attributable to the body-subject. Sensations of bodily displacement that accompany a dance 
move, for example, are recognized as integral to that movement but, significantly, we would 
usually identify an intentional component. In other words, it is simply assumed that a 
particular movement, along with any co-arising bodily sensations, is intended by the dancer. 
This stipulation need not preclude improvisation or more spontaneous bodily movement, 
but brings the argument into line with other areas of aesthetic judgment concerning, say, 
authorial intention. Bringing in arguments concerning intentionality (see McMahon, this 
issue) could only help in considering the example Montero herself provides, where a 
performer creates skillful representations of a bird in flight with their hands: “It seems that 
observers could see that such representations are beautiful or lively, for example, and, 
moreover, that the artist would not be barred from such perceptions merely because it is his 
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or her own body that is on view” (2006a:233). Which is to say, the aesthetic evaluation of 
the performance, perhaps incidentally involving culturally-based assumptions concerning 
gracefulness or verisimilitude when evoking birdflight onstage, is neither limited to an 
audience of external observers, nor to predominantly visual-auditory channels. This is 
plausible and lends credence to points 1a and 1b in Montero’s argument, and opens the way 
to the next stages: 
 
2a. An audience “may base certain aesthetic judgments about dancers in part on the 
internal experience of movement one has while watching dance” (2006a:240) 
2b. Empirical work on seeing movement in others “lends support to the view [that] 
while watching dancers we represent their movement in our bodies” (2006a:240) 
 
The leap to 2a now considers proprioception intersubjectively. As we have established that 
proprioception is recognized within an individual body-subject, Montero makes the further 
distinction that while the object of visual experience, a painting, may be experienced by 
many observers, “the object of proprioceptive experience, one’s own body, can be 
proprioceived only by oneself” (2006a:234). We might consider an analogy with pain here, 
being somewhat comparable to Wittgenstein’s position in Philosophical Investigations 
about the impossibility of experiencing another’s pain. More pertinently, since one does not 
know of one’s own pain, one simply has a pain, given the indistinct, intermittent and 
sometimes misleading nature of one’s own proprioceptive experience, the same criteria for 
proprioception might be advanced here. Increasing awareness of, and attunement to, 
proprioception arises as a result of coordinated and practiced movement in the dancing 
body, but for most of us our awareness of proprioception is only ever partial and sporadic. 
But in watching, learning from and talking to other dancers, argues Montero, a dancer can 
judge whether they are moving in a similar way (2006a:234). There need not be aesthetic 
relativism when it comes to judgments of proprioception, we can infer, since “dancers with 
similar training and abilities often agree on the proprioceptive qualities of certain 
movements, with some steps feeling awkward, others graceful, some dynamic, some 
dull…” (2006a:235). However, one corollary for the step to 2a and 2b is the dependence on 
the visual modality for watching a dancer and subsequently judging its aesthetic value. For 
both 1a and 1b, the ability to proprioceive and then aesthetically judge one’s own movement 
visual experience is not a prerequisite, whereas both 2a and 2b are premised on an audience 
watching a dance performance, even if a proprioceptive element is involved. A dancer may 
know, however a particular move appears to an audience, whether it flows correctly or feels 
‘right,’ and some imagination of how it will appear to others may occur. A blind or vision 
impaired dancer is accordingly as good a judge of the aesthetic criteria of their own 
movement as a fully-sighted dancer. Indeed, work with choreographing blind dancers 
undertaken by one of my graduate students, and instances of mixed blind, vision impaired 
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and sighted dance troupes show this to be the case. In such groups, the dynamics of 
improvising choreographies through a mixture of touch, proprioception and visual feedback 
from others demonstrates the interdependence between proprioception and vision in judging 
aesthetic criteria of the movements of another dancer as well as your own. Montero 
acknowledges something like this when discussing how “a dancer’s proprioceptive aesthetic 
sensibility is informed by his or her visual aesthetic sensibility” (2006a: 236) and vice versa. 
Judging that a movement is beautiful need not rest on the imaginative assumption that, if 
seen, it must appear or look beautiful or expressive of some intended emotion, say. Montero 
suggests that “in other cases, one might visually judge that a movement is beautiful because 
one knows that if proprioceived, this movement would feel beautiful” (2006a:236, emphasis 
mine). 
 
The claim that while watching the movements of dancers we somehow internalize that 
movement as a series of representations in our bodies (2b), is made irrespective of any 
concrete empirical evidence. Montero speculatively identifies possible neurophysiological 
mechanisms that might fill this criteria, so-called mirror neurons, but this is a big leap. 
Whether empirical explanations might be offered in future, this fails to detract from her 
suggestion that, based on 2b, “via this internal representation of movement we are, in a 
sense, proprioceiving the movements of others” (240). 
 
Now, in order to make inferences to advance her thesis about the next stage of the 
argument, that one is able to proprioceive another’s movement and that this is also a 
component of the assessment of aesthetic value, concerning the putative existence and role 
of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ in proprioception and the ability to proprioceive another’s 
movement.  
 
The next and final steps in her argument: 
 
3. “Since movement is the essence of dance, the aesthetic value of a dance partially 
depends on proprioceptive experience” (240). 
 
This would be proprioceptive experience by dancer and audience alike, although the 
audience is assumed to be normatively ‘abled’ and not restricted in motile ability, say 
quadraplegic. The next and final step: 
 
3a. Via these internalized responses and “internal representation of movement” of 
others in our own bodies, that is, ‘proprioceiving,’ the possibility exists that “we are, 
in a sense, proprioceiving the movements of others.” (2006a:240) 
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However, based on what has been covered in this paper so far, it will be argued that this 
understanding of proprioception (1a) is imprecise or incorrect, certainly in order for the later 
stages of the argument to follow. Overall, the implication from our earlier sections on the 
philosophical and psychological genealogy of aisthêsis is that it makes more sense to speak 
of kinaesthesia than proprioception in this way. If we have followed Montero’s reasoning 
up to this point, it is this crucial final step which returns us neatly to our earlier historical 
survey in terms of aisthêsis and the etymological and neologistic confusions surrounding 
these forms of somatic sensations. And because in this case there need not be any particular 
‘object’ that kinaesthesia or proprioception refer to, this implies a nonrepresentational 
element where such sensations refer not to ‘objects’ as such, but refer back onto the sensory 
body itself. 
 
Aesthetic considerations for somatosensory phenomena are more usually directed towards 
the experiences of the performer in a quasi-phenomenological way, of course. It is less 
problematic to introspect in order to attach aesthetic judgments, instances such as “[w]hen 
one’s movements are full of vibrant energy, power, and grace or conversely awkward, 
imbalanced, hesitant, and heavy, one can feel it proprioceptively and kinesthetically, in 
one’s muscles, joints, and bones” in the words of Shusterman (2011:154). This approach is 
familiar from the language of Husserl’s analysis of the kinestheses and from Merleau-
Ponty’s development of this, especially in his chapter on “The spatiality of one’s own body 
and motility” and its mention of “motor intentionality” in Phenomenology of Perception 
(1962:127ff). The significance of the philosophical implications of movement, and 
especially its import to phenomenology, lies outside the scope of this article (see e.g. 
Sheets-Johnstone 1981, 1999 for particularly detailed treatments of this aspect). Quite apart 
from such a phenomenologically inspired or introspective account of a body’s own somatic 
sensations, Montero’s final step and therefore a principal question for determining the 
possibility of an aesthetic evaluation of somatic sensations is the apprehension of movement 
in other bodies. From the perspective of an audience member watching another body 
performing, to what extent is the apprehension of that other body informed by similarly 
proprioceptive sensations, so that proprioception is involved in “perceiving the somatic 
styles of others,” as Shusterman puts it (2011:155)? In such a performance the question 
therefore becomes whether, as Montero formulates it, one may firstly “proprioceive the 
beauty of another’s movement” (2006a:231), and secondly, even if this were possible, how 
might one evaluate this aisthêsis as an aesthetic category? Furthermore, given that Sklar 
originates the term “kinaesthetic empathy” (1994:15), and subsequently Montero (2006a), 
Shusterman (2011) and Foster (2005) at some stage each invoke the empathetic perception 
of another’s movement, we demur. The last three point to the theory of mirror neurons (see 
e.g. Rizolatti and Sinigaglia 2008) as a possible explanation. Montero’s final step, or 
variants on it, is repeated in other theoretical approaches to dance, including Foster’s latest 
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book Choreographing Empathy: Kinesthesia in Performance (2011). What lies in common 
is the understandable need to consider the intersubjective nature of proprioceptive and 
kinaesthetic performances, but the leap to import empirical neuroscientific findings distilled 
into popular form, an intriguing yet nonetheless decontextualized theory of mirror neurons 
speculatively re-applied to contexts such as dance, should give us pause. While the 
implications for kinaesthesia might further our understanding of aisthêsis as both embodied 
and intersubjective, I now turn finally to specifically aesthetic considerations of aisthêsis 
and kinaesthesia. 
 
 
5. Kinaesthesia as Aesthetic Sense 
 
Previously we had noted the kinaesthetic orientation of a choreographer tentatively 
sketching out a new dance piece, or a painter approaching a blank canvas with a selection of 
kinaesthetic intentions and gestures. A kinaesthetic predisposition, a background capability 
that might then be played out through skillful movement. Likewise, Carrie Noland begins 
her book Agency and Embodiment (2009) by observing a graffiti artist spraying paint on the 
wall, and notices how movement and gesture were an integral part of the appreciation of 
that art form. Between the original script or ideogram, through a mixture of movements, 
repetition and improvisation, and the final product, a painted script on a wall, “a body was 
afforded a chance to feel itself moving through space” (2009:1) and so a performance 
emerges. Like any performance which requires deliberate movement, this is simultaneously 
a “repetitive routine and improvisational dance,” observes Noland. What she terms the 
“sensate motor body,” and we have referred to as the ‘sensory-motor’ body after Dewey, 
forms the medium upon which the “gestural regime” builds, she argues (2009:2). Overall, 
while Noland is more interested in questions of the ‘subject’ and ‘agency’ that result, she 
acknowledges how gestures belong to the domain of movement. Such iterative and 
performative gestures “provide kinesthetic sensations that remain in excess of what the 
gestures themselves might signify or accomplish in that culture” (2009:2). Much as in the 
discussion of aisthêsis above, the body’s awareness of its own position and movement, its 
own interoceptive ability or kinesthetic awareness, helps structure the range and indeed 
styles of movement that result.  
 
Whereas Montero shares a common and noble interest with Noland, Sklar, Foster and others 
in investigating other bodies in movement, Noland’s formulation stops short of seeking to 
validate these ideas through empirical data. We therefore take a step back, to consider like 
Noland how a body is afforded the chance to feel itself moving, as a kinaesthetically 
reflexive body as opposed to a merely proprioceptive one. For the iterations, the gestural 
regimes, the mimicking of the grace of a bird in flight, involves a quality of movement that 
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remains resolutely transitory yet absolutely recognizable, for performer and audience alike, 
without the need for theories of mirror neurons. Indeed, given the sporadic nature of 
neurophysiological treatments of the inner senses and kinaesthesia in particular, it might be 
surprising that dance criticism and dance pedagogy have long stressed the importance of 
kinaesthetic awareness in viewers as well as performers, throughout the twentieth century. 
One of the most influential dance critics of the time, John Martin wrote for the New York 
Times, and his approach to dance as a form of communication is premised on the audience’s 
active kinaesthetic engagement with the dancers onstage. As articulated here in America 
Dancing (1936), kinaesthesia is central to his thesis: 
 
When we see a human body moving, we see movement which is potentially 
producible by a human body and therefore by our own; through kinesthetic 
sympathy we actually reproduce it vicariously in our present muscular experience 
and awaken such associational connotations as might have been ours if the original 
movement had been of our own making. The irreducible minimum of equipment 
demanded of a spectator, therefore, is a kinesthetic sense in working condition. (John 
Martin 1936:117) 
 
To paraphrase Martin, for the aesthetic evaluation of a performance involving movement, 
therefore, the bare minimum of equipment is a working kinaesthetic sense not just for the 
dancer, but for the audience too. From a critic writing about dance to a dancer writing about 
dance, central to Deirdre Sklar’s comparable kinaesthetic analysis is the ability of dance 
researchers to perceive their own kinaesthetic experience, along with that of others (Sklar 
1994). Such reflexivity is premised on that proprioceptive ability to ‘feel’ and therefore 
recognize one’s own body and its movements as a crucial first methodological step, as 
Sherrington had suggested in his formulation of ‘proprio-ception,’ whether or not this 
subsequently becomes extended in the form of ‘kinaesthetic empathy,’ or to further social 
values, as a “social kinaesthetic” (see Foster 2011:8). That is, it is unnecessary to identify 
the exact neurophysiological mechanism involved in kinaesthetic empathy. Irrespective of 
whether this is the result of putative mirror neurons that fire sympathetically when seeing 
another body moving, there remains a privileging of certain modalities (vision and a form of 
inner touch) in our experience, or a form of ‘empathic vision’ based on proprioceiving the 
movements of others, as Montero would have it. Regardless of the actual mechanism, 
therefore, it is striking how effectively we are moved by other peoples’ movements, how an 
audience’s aesthetic response accompanies our sensory-motor (visual and proprioceptive) 
perception. At one stage Montero suggests that previous exposure to skillful dance is likely 
to affect our judgment of aesthetic value, effectively making kinaesthetic displays 
“resonate” with us (2006a:237). Certainly we might generalize this to other artforms, as 
Noland did with graffiti. Clearly, those of us with prior exposure to a kinaesthetic 
Essays Philos (2012) 13:2                                                                                                             Paterson | 493 
 
 
 
performance, whether it is dance, graffiti or sculpting objects in three dimensions, will 
certainly appreciate the level of skill involved in such controlled movements in space, as 
well as simply the way they appear visually, seem fluidly connected or skillfully composed. 
 
We now come full circle. My earlier revisitation to aisthêsis as a generalized sense faculty 
was in order to re-establish the capacity for aesthetic evaluation within the sensory body, 
validating forms of aesthetic judgment that lay outside the predominantly visual sway of the 
arts. Herder’s guidance in evaluating the three-dimensional form of sculpture as a form of 
‘inner sense’ whereby the audience could imaginatively palpate an object has been 
instructive, as this furthers the nonvisual aspects of ‘resonance’ or aesthetic evaluation. 
Furthermore, experiences of architecture and the built environment are increasingly 
discussed in nonvisual or ‘more-than visual’ terms (see e.g. Pallasmaa 2005; Paterson 
2011), where muscular movements of the eye and the kinaesthetic sensations of the walking 
body suggest a more haptic engagement with space, premised on an expanded notion of 
tactility. Indeed, the kinds of multimodal experiential encounter discussed so far are entirely 
consistent with that early twentieth area of art history that counters the ‘optic’ mode with 
the ‘haptic’ mode in painting (e.g. Aloïs Reigl, Heinrich Wölfflin). This suggests that the 
often hidden, underlying kinaesthetic orientation to aesthetic objects discussed in this paper 
through aisthêsis and kinaesthesia has multiple historical points of entry, each entreating us 
to expand our criteria for aesthetic evaluation into richer, less predictable sensory-motor 
areas. 
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